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AN ANALYSIS OF THE "PRIMA FACIE TORT"
CAUSE OF ACTION*
Morris D. Forkoscht
In the minuscule area of the modern prima facie tort as a cause of
action, it might be argued that we have retrograded to our common law
forbears. Nevertheless, it is submitted, we find in such theory the same
forward-looking approach that long since has led us out of the morass of
common law pleading and thinking. Our analysis of the doctrine will
reveal a somewhat general agreement, in pleading and in substance,
among the several American jurisdictions discussed, albeit in certain
aspects a marked disagreement is disclosed. At the same time, this
analysis will enable us to postulate an overall and generally acceptable
approach to the pleading and substance of such tort. To understand the
prima facie tort doctrine we must first briefly examine its common law
predecessors, and then see its modern American dress.
The skeletonal, procedural forms of writ at first overshadowed the
meat of the law.1 Hence, plausible as one's substantive case might
appear, if it did ". . . not fit any one of the receptacles provided by the
courts . . . the lesson [was] that where there is no remedy there is no
wrong.' 2 The early primitive basis of tort liability was to hold a person
liable for all harm inflicted upon another, so long as a form of action was
* The use of the prima fade tort concept as a cause of action is not restricted to actions
and proceedings involving labor and management. As a matter of legal pleading the prima
fade tort can be used in any factual situation wherein it is applicable, as disclosed hereafter.
The reason why labor lawyers are vitally interested in and concerned with the prima fade
tort as a cause of action is that in the labor-management field there are union activities ,
which, in quite a few instances, do not quite fall into "traditional tort categories, and yet -
involve actual spite or malice. Assuming other factors to be present, a law suit may be
instituted in such a situation even though no "traditional" cause of action results, the basis
now being the prima fade tort.
The New York courts, for example, are beginning to find this concept pressed upon them in
numerous instances, and the same is beginning to be true in other jurisdictions. The present
analysis, therefore, is of moment to judges and lawyers in the field of labor law.
t See Contributors Section Masthead, p. 519, for biographical data.
1 -... So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of
Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices
of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical
forms . . . 2' Maine, Early Law & Custom 389 (1883).
2 Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 4-5 (1941).
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provided by the law.3 Thereafter, the conception of wrongful intention
and negligence encroached upon the absoluteness of the original liability
and, to a degree, altered it.4 Thus a new, separate, and general rule of
law apparently, but not actually and historically, came into being, viz.,
whenever one damaged another, wilfully and intentionally, and without
just cause or excuse,5 a cause of action arose. The historical evolution
of the form of this cause of action, as distinguished from its substantive
nature and essential elements, discloses that the writ of trespass" was
the womb out of which the broad and elastic action on the case emerged.7
The action on the case8 was originally based upon the doing of an
unlawful act, i.e., "by the common custom of the realm" the conduct of
the defendant was regarded by the law as wrongful.9 But when motive
and malice' ° were assimilated, even though as and in special cases, a
subjective element was added which involved policy that, as described by
one English jurist, was an "unruly steed." While the growth of the
economy in England (and in America) demanded that novel causes of
3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law III, 375-77 (1923); VIII, 446, 449 (1926)
("primitive" is used at p. 447). See, however, for a contrary view, Winfield, "The Myth of
Absolute Liability," 42 L.Q. Rev. 37 (1926); see also Fifoot, The History and Sources of
the Common Law 187 (1949).
4 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3 at 447. At pp. 447-48 the background of the part
played by wrongful intention in the law of tort is developed.
-5 See also Forkosch, "The Doctrine of Just Cause as Applied to Labor Cases," 23 Temple
L.Q. 178 (1950), repr. 1 Lab. L.J. 789 (1950).
6 "[Oinly those [torts] which involve some violence-the violence may be exceedingly
small-are known as trespasses." Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law II, 511
(2d ed. 1923). For material and references on the origination of trespass, whether from the
appeal of felony or not, e.g., Reppy, Introduction to Civil Procedure 113 et seq. (1954).
7 Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability III, 223, 245 (1906), is insistent that a
differentiation be made in terminology, for "the two remedies of trespass and case divide
between them the entire field of tort. These are the two purely delictual remedies .... 
There is, he feels, an action of trespass, and a separate action of trespass on the case, which
between them embrace all the types of trespass. Separately, "The broad action on the case
is used to redress injuries which do not fall within either of the two trespass formations .... "
Maitland states that "really a new and a very elastic form of action has thus been
created . . . ." op. cit. supra note 2 at 66. See also note 8 infra, and Reppy, op. cit. supra
note 6 at 121 et seq.
8 This stems from, or is included in, the writ of trespass which became common during
the middle thirteenth century. The writ was "available in some form to recover compensation
for damage directly done by violence .... " Street, op. cit. supra note 7 at 232.
The authorities disagree as to the origin of the writ, but in general it included situations
which we might today call tortious. The writ of trespass (or action) on the case emerged
from the writ of trespass in somewhat of a cloud, but there is no question that it was not
quite the same as its predecessor and was therefore "new." See, e.g., Holmes, The Common
Law 274-75 (1881); Ames, Lectures, infra note 10 at 442, although compare arguments by
Plucknett, "Case and the Statute of Westminster II," 31 Colum. L. Rev. 778 (1931), and
Dix, "The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case," 46 Yale L.J. 1142 (1937). See
also note 7 supra.
9 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3, VIII, 449-50.
10 See, e.g., Ames, "How Far An Act May Be A Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of
the Actor," 18 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (1905), repr. in Ames, Lectures on Legal History 399, 411
(1913), at 411 n.1, borrowing Lord Bowen's adjective, "slippery," to describe the term
malice.
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action not be dismissed solely because they were novel,'1 the judiciary
was now called upon not only to hear a plaintiff's case but also to weigh
or balance the defendant's arguments; in other words, the courts were
to make and set policy.
For example, assume that a number of steamship owners group into
an association with the object of securing a particular carrying trade,
and allow rebates only to customers who will deal with them to the exclu-
sion of rivals. This practice drives a non-member out of business and
he sues; may he recover?' 2 Even with an allegation of malicious intent
to injure, the plaintiff cannot prevail against a justification based upon the
defendant's primary and controlling self-interest to increase profits, be-
cause the policy of the common law is to encourage all competition which is
not furthered by evil and otherwise unlawful means or ends.' Here the
balance of justice is a policy of fair economic competition which upholds
all conduct not otherwise illegal and transcends even "the worst possible
spirit of malevolent vindictiveness. . . ." Judicial policy, in this aspect,
reflects the political and the economic,' 5 and to the extent that the judiciary
is but one arm of our American tripartite form of government, govern-
mental policy as well.16
The action on the case was thus, as Maitland describes it, "a very
elastic form of action."' 7 As we have seen, it could be used not only for
11 E.g., Chapman v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. K.B. 145, 146, 95 Eng. Rep. 734 (1762):
... torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined . . .2
12 It should be noted that no statutory condemnation, analogous to the American
Sherman Antitrust Act, was then in force, and so only the common law could be invoked
to support the action which was based upon a conspiracy.
'3 See Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), affd., A.C. 25 (1892),
analyzed by this writer, supra note 5. See also note 37 infra.
14 Prosser, Torts 22 (2d ed. 1955).
1 In the Mogul Steamship case, supra note 13, Lord Bowen commented:
To say that a man is to trade freely, but that he is to stop short at any act which is
calculated to harm other tradesmen, and which is designed to attract business to his own
shop, would be a strange and impossible counsel or perfection ....
23 Q.B. at 615. Lord Fry wrote, at 625-26:
To draw a line between fair and unfair competition, between what is reasonable and
unreasonable, passes the power of the Courts. Competition exists when two or more
persons seek to possess or to enjoy the same thing: it follows that the success of one must
be the failure of another, and no principle of law enables us to interfere with or to
moderate that success or that failure so long as it is due to mere competition ....
(By statute, of course, e.g., our own Federal Trade Commission Act, and its amendments, as
well as the Robinson-Patman Act, we may legislatively draw a line between fair and unfair
competition which the judiciary now enforces; also, in questions of unfair competition such
as "palming-off," the courts likewise draw a judicial line between the licit and the illicit, as
Lord Bowen and Lord Fry, at pp. 615 and 626, themselves illustrated and as discussed in
Reddaway v. Banham, A.C. 199, 65 L.J.Q.B. 381 (1896).)
Throughout the discussion by any court or commentator upon the genesis and utilization
of the prima facie tort doctrine there flow aspects of unfair competition and other tortious
conduct; these "traditional" torts are excluded from discussion except peripherally.
16 E.g., the Congress has legislated in the field and has set forth the legislative policy as
one of free competition. See, in general, this writer's Antitrust and the Consumer (1956)
esp. Chaps. II and III, and his "Labor and Price Control," 2 Lab. LJ. 567 (1951).
17 Supra note 7.
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negligence in today's usual sense, but also for intentional injury.'8 It is
the limited area which this latter phrase evokes which is of importance
here. We must exclude negligence qua lack of care, breach of duty,
violation of statute, etc., from our discussion and concentrate upon the
intent, the motive, and the malice' 9 to do evil, i.e., to harm a person,
whether directly or indirectly, by setting in motion or furthering a chain
,of events. And yet the concept we examine is insufficiently stated in the
preceding sentence, for the "intent to do evil" should be further analyzed
with respect to its three terms: "intent," "to do," and "evil." For
example, we have stated that evil may be equated with "to harm a
person," and yet it has been held that various types and degrees of harm
will not suffice to create a legal "injury" that will give rise to a cause of
action. Accordingly, the maxim damnum absque injuria may apply2 0
Moreover, the application of this doctrine is not affected by the addition
of wilfulness.2 '
Previously we have remarked that the primitive basis of civil liability
held one responsible for all harm inflicted upon another, assuming a writ
was available. This concept, in effect, was furthered by both Lord
Bowen22 and Holmes"3 who spoke merely of the infliction of (temporal)
18 See, e.g., Wilson v. Smith, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 324 (1833), and Kelly v. Lett, 35 N.C.
g0 (1851). In Yates v. Joyce, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 136, 140 (1814), an action on the case was
brought by the assignee of a judgment which was a lien on defendant's property. It was
alleged that the defendant, knowing of the lien and assignment, and intending to injure
plaintiff and prevent him from having satisfaction, tore down a barn worth $300 and thereby
left the ground of less value than the judgment, with defendant being the insolvent and
otherwise unable to pay. Plaintiff received judgment, the court upholding the form:
It is the pride of the common law, that wherever it recognizes or creates a private
right, it also gives a remedy for the wilful violation of it .... If, then, there is any
remedy for [plaintiff], it is in this form of action only that he can obtain it ....
Compare, however, the famous squib case as to the requirement of immediacy of injury,
Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Win. Bl. 892, 3 Wis. K.B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124, 1127-28 (1773) (Black-
stone's dissent), and Street, op. cit. supra note 7 at 266, where, referring to the idea of
trespass for interference with domestic relations he states: "A significant fact in connection
with the use of the action of trespass in this field is that the principle that trespass lies only
for direct injury is flatly repudiated .... "
19 Motive and malice are used here for purposes of coloration, rather than description.
Their usage is not ordinarily admired. Pollock, Torts 18-20 (15th ed., Landon 1951).
20 E.g., the Mogul Steamship case, supra notes 13 and 15; Year Book of Henry IV, Hil.
11 Hen. IV 47, pl. 21 (A.D. 1410-11), cited and quoted in Pollock, op. cit. supra note 19, at
106-07.
21 See, e.g., Lord Dunedin's remarks in Sorrell v. Smith, A.C. 700, 727-28 (1925), referring
to Allen v. Flood, A.C. 1 (1898) (see, esp., Lord Herschell's remarks at 139-40, that the
proposition "that a man is bound in law to justify or excuse every wilful act which may
damage another in his property or trade . . . is far too wide; everything depends on the
nature of the act, and whether it is wrongful or not.")
22 In Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., 1 Ch. 413, 422, 62 L.J. Ch. 196 (1893): "At Common
Law there was a cause of action whenever one person did damage to another, wilfully and
intentionally, and without just cause or excuse." See also his dictum in the Mogul Steamship
case, supra note 13, 23 Q.B.D. at 613.
23 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904):
It has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage
is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form
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"damage," and did not include in their statements of the law any term
such as "injury," "wrong," etc. In effect they merely added "wilfully
and intentionally," or only "intentional," 24 to the primitive basis of civil
liability, and created a cause of action stemming from, if not based upon,
the intent to do harm. This approach was supported by Holmes as
follows: "It is no sufficient answer to this line of thought25 that motives
are not actionable and that the standards of the law are external. That
is true in determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not necessarily
in determining the extent to which he can justify harm which he has
foreseen.""'
The nub of this approach is found in the distinction between the con-
sequences of one's action which the law, as a matter of law, will hold one
to have foreseen, and the consequences which one personally knows will
actually flow from his action and deliberately, i.e., intentionally and
wilfully, so acts to produce. In this latter situation the facts, not the law,
coalesce into a factual and factually-intended harm, rather than a legally-
drawn one. When the law infers a consequence, it may additionally and
conditionally require a second legal item, namely, an "injury." In the
factual situation of harm and intent to harm, no legal inference is utilized
and, hence, no additional requirement apparently is necessary. 7  This
analysis, while perhaps strained, at least enables us to see how a distinc-
tion and a differentiation may conceivably be drawn, and to hold one
liable for his factual intention and factual deeds. Another possible
of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape (citing the Mogul
Steamship case) ....
In this case Holmes (White dissenting) upheld, as constitutional under the 14th Amendment
Due Process Clause, a Wisconsin statute which prohibited combinations for the purpose of
wilfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession. The
facts involved three newspapers combining in a rate war against a fourth, similar to the
Mogul Steamship facts, whereupon this criminal prosecution of the conspiracy followed.
24 Holmes meant, by the use of "intentional," whatever else might be added by "wilful,"
as used by Bowen, for Holmes knew of Sir Frederick Pollock's limitation of his general state-
ment, as quoted in note 30 infra, to a "wilful harm." See also Holmes' 1891 letter to Pollock
(Holmes-Pollock Letters 1, 35 (Howe ed. 1941)):
The general criterion of liability in tort for which I have contended as you know is
the tendency of an act under the circumstances known to the actor-according to com-
mon experience. If the probability of harm is very great and manifest the act is called
malicious or intentional .... If less but still sufficient to impose liability it is called
negligent ....
See further, Holmes, "Privilege, Malice, and Intent," 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894) repr. in
Collective Legal Papers 117-18 (1921).
25 See Holmes' language in note 23 supra for his line of thought, although there should
be added the additional aspect of a justification.
26 Aikens v. Wisconsin, supra note 23 at 204, citing Quinn v. Leathern, A.C. 495, 524
(1901).
27 See on this, the expressions by Holmes in his 1891 letter to Pollock, supra note 24.
28 As well as the "direct" consequences, e.g., as Pollock might well conclude, in his analysis
of the famous squib case, that Shepherd, who first threw the lighted squib into a building
full of people, "went about to do harm, and having begun an act of wrongful mischief, he
cannot stop the risk at his pleasure, nor confine it to the precise object he laid out, but must
abide it fully and to the end." Pollock, Torts 26 (15th ed., Landon 1951).
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distinction may be found in Pollock's 1874 letter to Holmes wherein he
distinguishes between "Delict proper [as] being the breach of a general
duty, i.e., not arising from any special position of the party [and] . . .
Quasi-delict [as] the breach of a particular duty (i.e., one which does
arise from, etc.) .. "29
This Pollock-Bowen-Holmes approach, if it thusly may be termed, has
been severely criticized abroad" and, in light of the English decisions,
apparently is not the law." One English writer has contended that "the
categories of tort (not, of course, the categories of particular torts [such
as negligence]) are closed. . . .[T]he search for any general principle
of liability must be in vain. The tortious quality of an act cannot be
discerned by intuition, any more than its criminal quality. It can only
be discovered by reference to the experience of our forefathers .... M2
And yet, it is submitted, the experience of our forefathers, which is found
in the common law, did not foreclose the legal proposition sponsored by
Pollock and furthered by Bowen and Holmes. At most, the common
law did not mention this proposition, that is, while it did not support it,
it did not reject it. Even the critics deny "that the law of torts does not,
or should not, develop, within its categories, in accordance with the ever-
changing needs of society." But to this statement they now add, "that,
in the practical atmosphere of a court of law, the -litigant cannot succeed
merely by asserting that he has been harmed: he must show that the
harm which he has suffered falls within one of the recognized categories
29 Holmes-Pollock Letters, supra note 24, I, 4. See, on the concept in general, the Holmes
letter quoted in the cited note.
30 Prof. Landon, in his fifteenth edition of Pollock, op. cit. supra note 28 at 40-46,
retained his 1939 Excursus A in which he remarked (p. 41) that Sir Frederick's "views
expressed are in some respects open to criticism." Quoting (at p. 42) the "general proposition
of English law" put forth by Pollock, "that it is a wrong to do wilful harm to one's neighbor
without lawful justification or -excuse," Prof. Landon points out that Sir Frederick, in his
first edition, "stated that there was 'no express authority that I know of' for this proposition;
but in 1892 Bowen L.J. in the course of his judgment in Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co.
[supra note 22] remarked obiter" to that effect and so enabled Pollock to claim it as
authority. However, continued Landon, "the truth is that the House of Lords has definitely
rejected any such general test . . . " in support, there were cited Mayor of Bradford
v. Pickles, A.C. 587 (1895), Allen v. Flood, supra note 21, and Sorrell v. Smith, A.C. 700
(1925).
These three decisions of the highest tribunal prove once and for all that the mere
infliction of harm upon a person does not give him either a right of action or a right
to call upon the defendant to justify his conduct. Pollock, however, refused to alter his
exposition. There was a stubborn texture in him which made him unwilling to admit
that his theories were erroneous, whatever the House of Lords might say. There can be
no doubt ... that the dicta of Bowen . . . have been held by the House of Lords to
be inconsistent with the basic principles of the common law ....
Pollock, op. cit. supra.
31 See, e.g., Lord Herschell's comments, supra note 21.
32 Prof. Landon, in Pollock, op. cit. supra note 30 at 45. Compare this language and
approach with that of Prof. Warren Seavey in his Cogitations on Torts 5-7 (1954), e.g.,
the law of torts "is not static but dynamic . . . . [Judges . . . should be most free from
the shackles of stare decisis . . . [so as to meet] the needs of successive generations."
[Vol. 42
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of liability. In short, despite Pollock's advocacy, a plaintiff does not
substantiate a cause of action by proving unjustifiable harm: he must
prove a [categorized] tort, not a mere academic theorem."' In other
words, the law is that a tort is not the showing of harm; therefore, merely
showing harm does not result in a tort cause of action! But, continues
the argument, the ever-changing needs of society permit (require?) a
development in the law of torts; this development, however, can occur
only within the recognized categories of liability; since merely showing
harm does not fall within one of the recognized categories of liability,
there can be no development of tort law which will embrace this area of
conduct! This circular and strait-jacket reasoning is fallacious in that it
rejects the extension to, or creation of, new categories of liability or,
within one of the recognized categories, denies the possibility of addition
or extension. And yet, as we have seen, the evolution of the action on the
case discloses that such methods of addition, extension, or creation not
only were possible but actually occurred in early English law.
Another mode of argument is suggested by the concept of the action
on the case, heretofore stated to be based originally upon the mere doing
of an unlawful act ("by the common custom of the realm" the conduct of
the defendant was regarded by the law as being wrongful). The common
law, similar to the law of today, dealt with facts as they occurred. These
facts were characterized as wrongful or not wrongful and, depending
upon the judicial cloak in which the facts were garbed, liability was or
was not upheld. But the judicial mind, in so characterizing the facts was
subjectively employed; hence questions of policy (and even of intuition!)
did enter. Thus, Pollock's limitation of the general principle to "wilful"
harm inflicted, or Bowen's to that harm "wilfully and intentionally"
inflicted, or Holmes' to that which was "intentional," incorporated and
utilized a concept which was not solely the infliction of harm, but which
required that it be something more. This "something more" might well
partake of the nature of a wrong, i.e., a delict or a quasi-delict. To quote
Lord Herschell, "everything depends on the nature of the act, and
whether it is wrongful or not."34 But the "nature" of the act is a judicial
characterization, and it is from this characterization that wrongfulness
does or does not flow! We are therefore in the arena of policy, whether it
be termed judicial or public.
There is a two-fold aspect of policy which enters the prima facie tort
theory. Assuming that we may accept the theory as a working principle,
the first and necessarily determinative question (where intent and
33 Ibid.
34 Supra note 21.
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temporal damage are conceded or proved) is whether, as a matter of
judicial policy, the conduct of the defendant is wrongful.3 5  Here, we
have translated the early "common custom of the realm" into "judicial
policy"; it is now required that defendant's conduct be characterized as
"a" wrong that the law will require him to justify. If the law upholds the
plaintiff's allegations as a legal cause of action then, when the defendant
seeks to justify, his facts must likewise be characterized as, or as not, a
"justification." 36 In other words, the law will weigh one policy against
the other and apply that which is more conducive to the public weal.
There can be no required justification or application of judicial policy to
defendant's facts before the plaintiff's cause of action is accepted as such.
But when the cause of action is upheld, policy necessarily enters in
characterizing the defendant's facts as or as not a justification. We may
now inquire why judicial policy is not initially permitted to enter the
plaintiff's case if and when the defendant is permitted to go forward with
his attempted justification.3" One obvious response is that in rejecting
35 We must not overlook the fact that plaintiff, in proving the facts to support his cause
of action, may additionally (or necessarily) prove facts which disclose a justification in
defendant. In such a situation the plaintiff has proved himself right out of a cause of action
and court, but the analysis here assumes no such factual occurrence.
36 On this aspect see this writer's "Doctrine of Just Cause as Applied to Labor Cases,"
supra note 5, and also his Treatise on Labor Law c. IX (1953).
37 In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 105-06, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-81 (1896), Holmes'
dissent produced these paragraphs (citations omitted) which, from the discussion already
had, are not difficult of understanding:
I agree, whatever may be the law in the case of a single defendant, . ..that when a
plaintiff proves that several persons have combined and conspired to injure his business,
and have done acts producing that effect, he shows temporal damage and a cause of
action, unless the facts disclose, or the defendants prove, some ground of excuse or
justification. And I take it to be settled, and rightly settled, that doing that damage
by combined persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it by falsehood or by force ....
Nevertheless, in numberless instances the law warrants the intentional infliction of
temporal damage because it regards it as justified. It is on the question of what shall
amount to a justification, and more especially on the nature of the considerations which
really determine or ought to determine the answer to that question, that judicial reasoning
seems to me often to be inadequate. The true grounds of decision are considerations of
policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody disputes. Propositions
as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are
capable of unanswerable proof. They require a special training to enable any one even
to form an intelligent opinion about them. In the early stages of law, at least, they
generally are acted on rather as inarticulate instincts than as definite ideas for which a
rational defense is ready.
To illustrate what I have said in the last paragraph, it has been the law for centuries
that a man may set up a business in a country town too small to support more than one,
although he expects and intends thereby to ruin some one already there, and succeeds in
his intent. In such a case he is not held to act 'unlawfully and without justifiable
"cause". . . . .The reason, of course, is that the doctrine generally has been accepted that
free competition is worth more to society than it costs, and that on this ground the
infliction of the damage is privileged .... Yet even this proposition nowadays is dis-
puted by a considerable body of persons, including many whose intelligence is not to be
denied, little as we may agree with them.
I have chosen this illustration partly with reference to what I have to say next. It
shows without the need of further authority that the policy of allowing free competition
justifies the intentional infliction of temporal damage, including the damage of inter-
[Vol. 42
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the prima facie tort doctrine the English judiciary has thereby exercised
just such approach and held it to be against judicial policy to require
anyone to respond under such factual situation. Secondly, it might be
argued that Parliament may always characterize a situation as wrongful
(which it has not done with respect to this doctrine), whereupon the
judiciary must accept and follow this legislatively-imposed public
policy.38 Thirdly, it may be urged that permitting such a cause of action.
to be availed of would open a veritable Pandora's box of legal ills which
the body economic (and judicial) could not sustain. But these arguments
are not particularly satisfying. The second concedes that the judiciary
has promulgated the policy against the doctrine, even though the legis-
lature may change it. We are forced back to the first argument which
wholly disregards the historical fact that the action on the case remains
an evolving and changing concept that was born of necessity and nur-
tured in torment. Since policy is changeable and responsive, judicial
approaches and concepts react differently in successive generations; 3 9
no judicial system has ever stood still. The third argument confesses a
judicial impotency to rectify injustices and right wrongs which stands as
an anomaly in the light of modern emphasis upon the individual's civil
and legal rights.
Nevertheless, the judicial answer of the English courts has been that
no prima facie tort cause of action, as we analyze the term in this paper,
can be utilized. Of course, we might slightly alter Holmes' statement of
the doctrine by stating that prima facie, the intentional infliction
of "injury" (not merely "temporal damage") gives rise to a cause of
action which requires a justification if the defendant is to escape. This is
obviously acceptable to the English courts, but we do violence to the
concepts here analyzed. The terms "injury" and "damage" or "harm"
vary in legal meaning and result in different conclusions of law in the
formulation of the doctrine. With this caveat, we turn to the American
decisions, emphasizing but a few of the jurisdictions because of the
manifest difficulty in covering all state and federal cases.
ference with a man's business, by some means, when the damage is done not for its own
sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade ....
The only debatable ground is the nature of the means by which such damage may be
inflicted. We all agree that it cannot be done by force or threats of force ....
38 See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, supra note 23; also, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), and this writer's "Jurisdiction [of the N.L.R.B.] And Its Impact
on State Powers," 16 Ohio St. LJ. 301 (1955).
39 See, e.g., Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 283-84 (1929), disclosing
the fourteenth century judicial distinction between trespass and case, and the development
of the latter by creating new forms of action. In America, for example, reversals have so
done, e.g., Lincoln Federal ,Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949) (analysis and citations in Black's opinion for the Court); Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916) ; Prosser, Torts 636 (2d ed. 1955).
1957]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
We have already noted Holmes' early exposition of the prima facie tort
doctrine, written during his tenure on the Supreme Court of the United
States;40 he never deviated from this approach.4 Such views, however,
had been formulated and promulgated while he was a member of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court.42 There, in 1896, he upheld as a cause of
action but justified on the facts "the intentional inflicting of temporal
damage, including the damage of interference with a man's business,"
when free competition "in the battle of trade" so required it.43 Although,
in effect, he was merely following earlier Massachusetts law,44 his col-
leagues apparently had to be convinced of this fact. Hence, when he later
dissented in a particular situation, he nevertheless could write that: "The
difference between my brethren and me now seems to be a difference of
degree. . ... " In Massachusetts, therefore, whether committed by
(apparently) one or (definitely) more persons who act in concert, the
intentional infliction of damage without justification gives rise to a cause
of action.46 This statement, however, is somewhat deceptive. By includ-
ing "without justification" we either require a term or add an aura; if
the former, then our prima facie tort theory is somewhat altered; if the
latter, then we include a frame of reference in our discussion which, at
40 Supra note 23.
41 See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350 (1921).
It is interesting to note that plaintiff-appellants argued, inter alia that:
Motive is sometimes controlling . . . .The tendency is away from the doctrine of the
cases originating with Allen v. Flood [supra note 211 ... .One of the first departures
from this doctrine was announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass.
492, ... 57 N.E. 1011.
In his opinion in the American Bank case, at p. 358, Holmes wrote:
But the word "right" is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from
a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusions. Most rights
are qualified .... The interests of business also are recognized as rights, protected
against injury to a greater or less extent, and in case of conflict between the claims of
business, on the one side, and of third persons, on the other, lines have to be drawn that
limit both. A man has a right to give advice, but advice given for the sole purpose of
injuring another's business, and effective on a large scale, might create a cause of action.
. . . If without a word of falsehood, but acting from what we have called disinterested
malevolence, a man by persuasion should organize and carry into effect a run upon a
bank, and ruin it, we cannot doubt that an action would lie ....
Of course Holmes shortly points out that "this is not private business" which is here
involved.
42 In the gathering of material for the jurisdictions which follow, except for that of New
York, I have relied upon, and wish to express my appreciation for, the efforts of two students,
Stephen Lang and Gerald Bitman.
43 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896).
44 E.g., Walker v. Cornin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 (1871): "The intentional causing of such
loss to another, without justifiable cause, and with the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of
itself a wrong. This proposition seems to be fully sustained by the references in the case
of Carew v. Rutherford (1870), 106 Mass. 1, 10, 11."
45 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900).
46 E.g., Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 1318 (1948); Vegelahn v. Guntner,
supra note 43; Carew v. Rutherford, supra note 44; Hale, "Prima Facie Torts, Combination,
and Non-Feasance," 46 Colum. L. Rev. 196 (1946), adopts the views of Holmes, now
accepted by a large majority of jurisdictions, that combination is not necessary or essential
to support a prima fade tort.
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the outset, is not present. The corrected statement of law might read
better as follows: (1) the intentional infliction of harm or damage prima
facie gives rise to a cause of action; (2) where the pleading of allegations
of this cause of action itself discloses a justification, then no sufficient
cause of action arises; (3) where (2) is not present and, hence, only (1)
appears, unless the defendant(s) pleads and proves a justification, the
plaintiff's cause of action, if proved, will be sufficient to support a judg-
ment." The defendants' justification so pleaded or proved must consist
of interests (or rights?) which are "direct and immediate and not
indirect, remote or consequential."4  Also, there must be "an intention
on the part of the . . . [defendants] to injure the plaintiff," otherwise
the defendants' conduct, "though resulting incidentally in damage to the
plaintiff, was not a wrong. . . ,,4' This intent to injure may be either
primary or secondary; the former in the sense that defendants' primary
object or purpose in engaging in the conduct is to cause the harm or
damage; the latter in the sense that defendants' self-interest requires that
certain (ends and) means be engaged in which, although known by defend-
ants necessarily to result in harm or damage to plaintiffs, are not the
primary reason for their conduct in the context of activities and desires.
Only a primary intention to injure is actionable in Massachusetts. °
In New York the prima facie tort doctrine has apparently had its
greatest degree of legal adumbration, sophistication, and qualification.
The doctrine is accepted as per se supporting a cause of action, but the
requirements surrounding its pleading and proving are numerous and
minute. Thus, "where specific torts account for all the damages sus-
tained, whether provable as general damages or pleadable or provable as;
special damages, prima facie tort does not lie." 51 In other words, the
doctrine supports a sort of residual or last-chance cause of action, deriv-
ing "from the ancient form of action on the case, [and] covering those
47 E.g., Johnson v. East Boston Savings Bank, 290 Mass. 441, 195 N.E. 727 (1935).
48 Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 72, 76 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1947), per Qua, J., first
setting forth as law "that intentional harm to the business of another . . . is a tort unless
justified . . . " Note that the Massachusetts court states that "a tort" results, but it must
be cautioned that the facts included a combination of defendants.
49 Boylston Housing Corp. v. O'Toole, 321 Mass. 538, 552, 74 N.E.2d 288, 297 (1947).
50 Robitaille v. Morse, 283 Mass. 27, 32, 186 N.E. 78, 80 (1933);
An illegal primary object or purpose is not made out under the law simply because
one of the purposes in seeking to secure a trade advantage by a combination is the
destruction and ruin of the business of another. it is necessary that such a purpose
should be the primary object of the combination entered into with the malicious
intention of damaging the plaintiff, and that the means used should cause his damage.
51 Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 770, 146 N.Y.S.2d 308, 811 (1st Dep't 1955). The
illegality of the means or methods, or of the purposes or ends, is ordinarily sufficient for a
traditional category of tort to be invoked. It is only when neither the means nor the ends
can, by virtue of their illegality or other categorization, support a known tort cause of action
that recourse may ultimately and conceivably be had to the prima facie tort doctrine. For
a discussion of the means-end doctrine, see this writer's Treatise on Labor Law c. IX (1953).
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situations where intentional harm has been inflicted, resulting in damage,
by an act or series of acts which might otherwise be lawful and which do
not fall within the category of traditional tort actions.""2 The intention
to harm must be "distinguished from the intention merely to commit the
act," and when this specific intention to harm "has motivated the action,
and has caused the injury to plaintiff, all without excuse or justification,"
the doctrine may be invoked 3 The purpose of the defendant must be
"'solely to produce damage,"54 even though he ordinarily has a right to do
what he does.55 "The key to the prima facie tort is the infliction of
intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by
an act or a series of acts which would otherwise be lawful."5 (Emphasis
added.) As originally suggested, the New York "courts have sought to
confine the doctrine within reasonable limits by requiring [a] plaintiff
to state in his complaint the material facts, not merely conclusions, in
plain and concise form; to separately state the allegations referable to
this cause as distinguished from the allegations which may be the basis
for the pleading of other causes concerned with specific traditional torts;
and to allege special damages, which alone are recoverable for such prima
facie tort."5 7 These allegations of special damage "must state specifically
52 Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 148
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1956), citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, supra note 23, and Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946), among other
New York cases.
53 Ruza v. Ruza, supra note 51 at 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811, quoted in Benton v. Kennedy-
Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 28, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1st Dep't 1956).
The term "operative misconduct," has been used by the courts to denote and limit the factual
situation. See, e.g., Best Window Co. v. Better Business Bureau, 2 Misc. 2d 55, 59, 146
N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (11955); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 343, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865,
869 (lst Dep't 1954). Only a person so injured may avail himself of the cause of action, e.g.,
the cause as a counterclaim is available only to the defendant able to plead the necessary
allegations and not to his co-defendants. Arco Painting Corp. v. Klemitt Const. Corp., per
Benvenga, J., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1957, p. 6, col. 6.
54 A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 1 Misc. 2d 788, 791, 148 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1955),
quoting from Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta, 279 App. Div. 656, 657, 107 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716
(2d Dep't 1951). See also Hutson v. Bright (N.Y. County,.Spec. III) N.Y.LJ., Dec. 13,
1956), p. 8, col. 1, per McGivern, J.:
The basic issue emerging, therefore, is the question whether defendant is genuinely
pursuing the avowed purpose or whether its acts are conceived and motivated solely in
revenge, as claimed, with no concern for legitimate labor objective ....
55 "The second involves doing what is right but with malevolence, including an intent
to cause injury." Best Window Co. v. Better Business Bureau, 148 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656,
rev'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 1001, 151 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1st Dep't 1956) (complaint dismissed because
of deficiencies in pleading), referring to the situation found in Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y.
80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).
56 Ruza v. Ruza, supra note 51 at 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
57 Sheppard v. Coopers' Inc., 156 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (1956) (citations before each semi-
colon omitted). See also Test v. Eldot (N.Y. County, Spec. III) N.Y.LJ., Feb. 29, 1956,
p. 7, col. 4, per Saypol, J.:
To permit a recovery in prima facie tort upon an allegation and proof of general
damage would throw open to regulation of morals and ethics all conduct which, when
substandard, results in injured feelings without other and special damage. It is the
allegation of temporal damage which makes such an action maintainable upon a proper
statement of a cause in prima facie tort ....
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and with particularity the item of loss claimed by the plaintiff, giving the
names of the employers, customers or others who are claimed to have
taken away their business from plaintiff.","
Apart from these three pleading requirements there is a fourth requisite
which the New York Court of Appeals has left in a state of questionable
confusion as to its proof, namely, the question of intent (motive, malice).
We have already mentioned the necessity of an intention to harm, as
distinguished from an intention to commit the act, but the pleading must
allege not only such an intent but also that it was the sole motivation for
the acts complained of. In Massachusetts there is apparently a distinc-
tion between a primary and secondary intent or purpose, but in New
York this distinction has seemingly been abandoned if Reinforce, Inc. v.
Birney, decided December 31, 1954, may be so interpreted. 59  In
that case the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the
evidence in support of the pleading "was insufficient to show that malice
was the only spur to the union's activity, or that damage to plaintiffs was
the union's sole purpose." The court also upheld the trial judge's charge
"that if the motives were found to be mixed-good or bad-defendants
must win the case, provided their acts had some reasonable relation to
wages, hours of employment, collective bargaining or some other valid
union objective." The dismissal of the complaint by the intermediate
appellate court was likewise upheld "because plaintiffs did not carry their
burden of showing that defendants' acts were solely 'malicious,' that is,-
that they were done 'without legal or social justification' .... 1 These
statements and views, which the majority of the Court of Appeals
accepted must be contrasted with the statements of the court itself, for
there is a possible source of confusion, if not inconsistency, to be found.
The trial judge felt that the evidence was insufficient to disclose malice
as "the only spur," or that plaintiff's damage "was the union's sole pur-
pose." The appellate division dismissed the complaint because the plain-
tiffs failed to show that the defendants' actions "were solely" malicious.
These terms warrant the inference that the plaintiff cannot plead or prove
merely that the primary motive or intent -was the malicious infliction of
temporal damage, 6ut that no demarcation into primary' and secondary
58 Fa-0i1v. Aware, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1956).
59 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954). The quotations which follow are at the pages
parenthesized. The Reinforce decision was by a bare majority of four to three, with the
three dissenters joining in a minority opinion. Since this decision the composition of the Court
of Appeals has changed, but only by the replacement of one of the minority judges, so that
even if the new judge votes as did his predecessor, the Reinforce determination will not be
reversed. It is therefore the current law of New York.
60 At p. 106. The minority felt that "This is an action for damages for -conspiracy, in
ruining plaintiff's business by concerted action that has no relation to any lawful labor union
objective." (p. 109).
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is permissible. In other words, apparently plaintiff must plead that no
portion of the defendants' act was conceived of a purpose other than
malice; that defendants' "only" motive is the malicious infliction of harm.
This raises the question of mixed motives, that is good and bad, which is
found in the rephrased charge of the trial judge. The rephrasing by the
Court of Appeals was that the defendants in such a mixed situation must
prevail, "provided" their acts "had some reasonable relation" to self-
interest and betterment, i.e., a "valid union objective." The inference
now permitted to be drawn is that in a situation where a primary and a
secondary motive are disclosed, the defendants win provided they prove
(or the facts as pleaded or proved by plaintiff disclose) a reasonable
relation between their acts and a valid union objective. In short, the
court finds that their motives are primarily involved with self-interest
and betterment. In effect, this is the Massachusetts approach, but the
following language of the Court of Appeals either rejects or restricts this
approach:61
But when men quit work in concert, they offend against the law if their
sole and unmixed motive or purpose is to injure an employer. But, if the
acts of unions "have any reasonable connection with wages, hours of employ-
ment, health, safety, the right of collective bargaining, or any other condi-
tion of employment or for the protection from labor abuses, then the acts
are justified." The result is not changed by the fact that the work stoppage
or refusal injures an employee. Such harm, although intentionally done,
is actionable only if not justified. If the doers, by means not in themselves
unlawful, of acts not in themselves unlawful, have any proper purpose
to serve, they are not liable for the damage they cause. Unions, as well
as everyone else, may claim the benefit of the settled rule that "the gen-
esis which will make a lawful act unlawful must be a malicious one un-
mixed with any other and exclusively directed to injury and damage of
another.. . . .
In the absence of proof that the motivation was entirely malicious,
plaintiff had no remedy at law. In the Rochette situation, the union with-
drew its members from an employment because the union thought it to its
interest so to do. In each case it was impossible on the record, to find that
the sole motivation was "malicious," hence, there was no basis for a judg-
ment against the union. (Emphasis added.)
Such language seemingly indicates that the Court of Appeals has
rejected the Massachusetts approach and modified somewhat its apparent
support of the trial judge's charge. To this view we may now add these
quoted words: "In the absence of proof that the motivation was entirely
malicious, plaintiff had no remedy at law," and conclude that it is the
plaintiff, not the defendant, who has the burden of, and who must go
61 308 N.Y. at 169-70, 124 N.E.2d at 106-07. Citations are omitted, although it should be
mentioned that Aikens v. Wisconsin, supra note 23, was one of these citations. The Rochette
case discussed is Rochette v. Parzini Corp., 301 N.Y. 228, 93 N.E.2d 652 (1950).
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forward with, the proof to disclose a "sole and unmixed motive or pur-
pose." If this analysis of the New York position is correct, it follows
that the prima facie tort doctrine, as evolved in English common law
and as utilized in the federal and Massachusetts jursdictions, has been
modified 62 to the extent that it is difficult, if not impossible, in a practical
situation, for a plaintiff to succeed. Some of the reasons for these restric-
tions have been footnoted.63 It may well be that in a trade and business
atmosphere where great commercial interests and numerous types of
litigation are involved, Pandora's box is kept closed as a practical matter
by placing numerous and additional safeguards upon it. It would appear,
however, that the strings have been pulled too tightly, for the cause of
action is choking to death if the ramifications above developed are
accepted as law.
The legal view and overall approach in other jurisdictions, generally
speaking, is patterned upon the federal and Massachusetts position,
although minor exceptions are similarly found. For example, Connecticut
"usually follows the Massachusetts approach,64 while an 1898 Illinois
decision denounced interferences with one's business "from motives of
malice" 65 because, as another case declared, "it is the motive that deter-
mines the question of liability."66 While trade competition is ordinarily
a sufficient justification, "the mere fact that the person . . . [so
motivated] has a temporal or pecuniary interest to be served by the act
is not such justification. 67 Iowa6 has adopted the Minnesota approach
which, in general, follows the Massachusetts view albeit with a slight
inclination towards the stricter New York position. Thus a 1909
Minnesota opinion stated:
To divert to oneself the customers of a business rival by the offer of goods
at a lower price is in general a legitimate mode of serving one's own inter-
est, and justifiable as fair competition. But when a man starts an opposi-
tion place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless
62 The prima faie tort doctrine states, as we have seen, that where it applies it is the
defendant who must justify; now, if the New York courts are to follow the reasoning above
given, the plaintiff must, as part of his case, first disprove the availability of a justification
by and on behalf of the defendants, else he has failed to make out and prove a sufficient cause
of action. This, it is submitted, is rather harsh and not the intention of the judiciary albeit
such are the consequences which flow.
63 Supra note 57.
64 E.g., R and W Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922); Connors
v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913).
65 Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898).
66 Kemp v. Division No. 241, etc., 255 Ill. 213, 240, 99 N.E. 389, 399 (1912). See, how-
ever, Feeley v. McAuliffe, 335 Ill. App. 99, 104, 80 N.E.2d 373, 375-76 (1948): "So long as
the conduct was lawful, any question of bitterness and hostility on the part of the actor
is immaterial .... "
67 Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee etc., 333 IMI. 225, 236, 164 N.E. 393, 397
(1928).
68 E.g., Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 115, 143 N.W. 482 (1913);
Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 624, 132 N.W. 371 (1911).
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of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of
business, and with the intention of himself retiring upon the accomplish-
ment of his malevolent purpose, . . . he is guilty of a wanton wrong and an
actionable tort.6
9
d New Jersey7" and North Carolina71 likewise support the Massachusetts
position but California, for example, holds that an act lawful in itself
does not become unlawful or actionable merely because of the presence
of a malicious or wrongful motive.72 Thus, even though one's purpose is-
to injure another's business, absent illegal means or (other illegal) ends.
no cause of action arises.73 There is some indication, however, that this
negative approach may be in the process of change.74
In the light of legal history, the prima facie tort doctrine, as above
discussed and analyzed, does not represent an exception to the traditional
concepts upon which other tort causes of action are based. A prima facie
tort, like other tort concepts, emerged from the common law writs but
non-use apparently resulted in desuetude until resurrected by necessity.
Now, however, resurrection and condition go hand in hand. Before the
doctrine can be employed, certain conditions, strict in some jurisdictions
and less strict in others, must be met. ,In New York, as a practical
matter, the exceedingly strict requirements will relegate the use of this
doctrine to limbo unless, as it is here suggested, the Reinforce strictures
be limited to the facts of that case or to the type of contractor-union
situation there involved. Holmes' overall approach, in general, has been
adopted in other jurisdictions, but not always in its complete form. The
courts, however, are still engaged in evolving another "traditional" cause
of action which may or may not be denominated a prima facie tort,
although its genesis is there traceable. The following appear to be the
69 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909). The use of "fair com-
petition" in juxtaposition to "justifiable" permits us to utilize, as a corollary, the use of
"unfair competition" as non-justifiable. In this aspect, therefore, this case might well hold
that the "traditional" tort of unfair competition sustains an ordinary cause of action, eliminat-
ing the prima facie tort doctrine from consideration. On this analysis see Schonwald
v. Ragains, 32 Okla. 230, 122 Pac. 203 (1912), approving the Tuttle doctrine in an unfair
competition case. See also Canellos v. Zotalis, 145 Minn. 292, 177 N.W. 133 (1920),
distinguishing its facts from the Tuttle case, and Harding v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 230
Minn. 583, 41 N.W.2d 818 (1950).
70 E.g., Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 NJ.L. 582, 586, 175 Ati. 62, 66 (1934), holding "natural
justice" provides a remedy; Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (1947);
Stein v. Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218 (1943); Standard Radio Corp. v. Triangle Radio Tubes,
Inc., 125 NJ..L. 131, 14 A.2d 763 (1940);
73 E.g., Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494,35 S.E.2d 647 (1945), approved and followed
in dictum in Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
72 People v. Schmitz, 7 Cal. App. 330, 94 Pac. 407 (1908); Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal.
578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893).
73 E.g., Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935); Union Labor Hospital
Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 112 Pac. 886 (1910).
74 See, e.g., Masoni v. Board of Trade of San Francisco, 119 Cal. App. 2d 738, 742, 260
P.2d 205, 208 (1953), where the court's opinion referred to a "balancing of the importance,
social and private, of the objective advanced by the interference. .. "
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characteristics, if not the essential elements, of such an evolving tort
cause of action, although in listing these items many of this writer's views
are incorporated:
1. The prima facie tort doctrine is a separate and distinct theory and
Jiould not be confused with the traditional torts.
2. If there is any other traditional tort available, then a prima facie
thrt cause of action should not lie.75
3. The prima facie tort cause of action is applicable whether one or
more persons act.76
4. The presence of intent, as further described in the following items
and not merely motive, desire or purpose, is an essential element in such
a cause of action.
5. The intent is factual, rather than legal, although it may be
"mixed."
6. The intent is to commit the harm or damage, not merely the act
that occasions the harm or damage.
7. The intent contains aspects or elements of malice, a wicked or evil
motive.
8. These aspects of malicious intent or motive not only must be
"primary" but must dominate the overall picture.
9. There must be temporal harm or damage which resulted from the
acts so motivated or was so intended to result.
10. This resulting temporal damage must not be speculative or so
indirect or remote as to require strained findings of fact by the court or
jury.
11. Such temporal damage must be specifically pleaded and proved.
12. Unless there is compliance with item 11, there is no cause of
action.
13. If there is compliance with item 11 and a cause of action other-
wise is found to exist, consequential and punitive damages should also
be allowed. 78
14. A justification, if found in the facts as pleaded, destroys the
75 However, because of the suggestion in item 12 below, that punitive damages be avail-
able, it may be that this view should be modified to permit a prima fade tort cause of action
so as to pufiish the commission of these wicked acts. This writer does not, as yet, subscribe
to this view.
76 See, however, note 46 supra, and text.
77 However, this does not mean that the New York view is herein adopted, nor does it
mean that it is the Massachusetts view which is favored. Rather, a mean between the two
is utilized, namely, that intent is divided into primary and secondary, but that the former
is to dominate and control the total picture. Whether or not such domination and control is
present in a particular fact situation is, or course, a question for judicial (policy) determina-
tion, so that no rigid formula can be attempted.
78 See, for the opposed New York rule, note 57 supra.
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existence (assuming it ever did exist) of any cause of action denominated
as a prima facie tort.
15. If a justification is not found in the allegations of the complaint,
the defendant(s) may plead a justification.
16. The justification so pleaded must be as broad as the charge in
order to be a complete one; otherwise, it may be used in mitigation of
damages.
17. The justification need not be as dominant as is the malice charged
in the complaint (as required in items 6, 7, and 8, above) but it must be
the primary raison d'etre.79
18. In determining whether the charge of evil or the defense of
justification should control, the court (jury) must weigh not only the
conflicting private interests involved but also the welfare and interests
of the people, i.e., the state.
19. In any event, the burden is upon the plaintiff to plead, prove, and
disclose a controlling interest which is served best through the medium
of a judgment in the action.
79 In this suggestion we reject the (apparent) New York view and utilize that of
Massachusetts, as discussed in the text keyed to note 50 supra.
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